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CRIMINAL LAW-ENTRAPMENT: ILLEGAL POLICE
CONDUCT GETS STUNG BY THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
IN STATE V KUMMER.
State v. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d 437 (N.D. 1992)
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 17, 1990, Terry Lee Kummer was offered a
chance to purchase cocaine by a telephone caller.' The caller was
an informant for law enforcement agents from the State Bureau of
Criminal Investigations and the Fargo Police Department.2 The
call was taped.3 Kummer asked whether the cocaine was of better
quality "than it had been in the past" and said he would contact
the informant the next Wednesday; however, Kummer did not
call. 4 The informant made another taped call to Kummer on Sep-
tember 21, during which Kummer agreed to purchase three
ounces of cocaine at $1,200 per ounce.5 During two calls initiated
by the informant a week later, a meeting was arranged for the
transaction.6 On September 30, 1990, an exchange was made in a
room at a Fargo motel.7 Law enforcement agents, who had been
listening from another room through electronic surveillance
equipment, arrested Kummer and confiscated the money and the
drugs." The cocaine had been obtained by the officers from the
evidence room of the Fargo Police Department. 9 Department
regulations were not followed, 10 and it appears this use of confis-
1. State v. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d 437, 438 (N.D. 1992). The informant asked when
Kummer would be in Fargo "to take advantage of a 'good deal' on cocaine." Id.
2. Id. The informant had been promised a "favorable" recommendation to the state's
attorney regarding his own arrest for drug trafficking. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Kummer, 481 N.W. 2d at 438.
6. Id. at 439.
7. Id. The rooms were rented by Special Agent Baumann of the State Bureau of
Criminal Investigations. Brief for Appellant at 3, State v. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d 437 (N.D.
1992) (No. 910138).
8. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 439.
9. Id. The cocaine was contraband from an earlier, closed drug case. Id. A state agent
and a Fargo policeman planned the quantity and price of cocaine which Kummer would be
offered. Id. at 438. Special Agent Baumann of the North Dakota Bureau of Criminal
Investigations-Narcotics Division testified at trial that he "supplied an amount" of cocaine
to offer Kummer. Transcript on Appeal (Jury Trial) at 120, State v. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d
437 (N.D. 1992) (No. 910138) [hereinafter Transcript on Appeal.]. He also testified that he
estimated three ounces to be evidence of possession with intent to deliver. Id. Possession
with intent to deliver carries a greater penalty than does mere possession. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 19-03.1-23(1Xa) (Supp. 1993) (making possession of a schedule II narcotic with
intent to deliver a class A felony); § 19-03.1-23(b) (Supp. 1993) (making mere possession a
class C felony); § 12.1-32-01(2) (1985) (providing a maximum penalty of twenty years
imprisonment and/or a $20,000 fine for a class A felony); § 12.1-32-01(4) (1995) (providing a
maximum of five years imprisonment and/or a $5,000 fine for a class C felony).
10. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 443. During cross-examination, Officer Weaver quoted
970 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:969
cated narcotics was contrary to state law."
Kummer was charged under state law for the possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver.' 2  A jury found him
guilty, rejecting his entrapment defense.13 Kummer appealed.' 4
The North Dakota Supreme Court overturned the conviction,
holding that law enforcement agents had entrapped Kummer "as
a matter of law" when they unlawfully provided the cocaine
which was used as the basis for the prosecution.' 5
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, courts have recognized that police must
sometimes use deception and trickery in order to effectively
detect and apprehend certain criminals.' 6 Nevertheless, these
same courts have shown an unwillingness to countenance law
enforcement conduct which actually manufactures crimes.' 7
Merely providing unwary criminals an opportunity to commit
crimes under circumstances allowing for detection is proper con-
duct for government agencies.' However, actually creating crime
the Fargo Police Department procedures as saying, "Section C states, 'Narcotics, dangerous
drugs, and drug implements will be taken to the Toxicology Lab at N.D.S.U. and destroyed
in the presence of the property custodian or appropriate designee.' " Transcript on Appeal,
supra note 9, at 146.
11. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 443 (suggesting there is no statutory authority for
removing narcotics from evidentiary retention and citing § 19-03.1-36(4) of the North
Dakota Century Code, which provides for district court control over the handling of
confiscated narcotics).
12. Id. at 439. Cocaine is a schedule II narcotic under state law. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 19-03.1-07(3Xd) (1991). It is a Class A felony to willfully "manufacture, deliver, or possess
with intent to manufacture or deliver" a schedule II controlled substance. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 19-03.1-23(lXaXSupp. 1993).
13. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 439.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 444.
16. See Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992) (allowing that "there can
be no dispute that the Government may use undercover agents to enforce the law");
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932) (stating that "[airtifice and stratagem may
be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises"); State v. Flamm, 338 N.W.2d
826, 829 (N.D. 1983) (finding that "[s]tratagem is needed particularly in detecting vice
crimes such as illegal drug sales").
17. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540 (recognizing that "[in their zeal to enforce the law, ....
Government agents may not originate a criminal design, implant in an innocent person's
mind the disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induce commission of the crime so
that the Government may prosecute"); Sorrels, 287 U.S. at 441 (stating that "gross abuse of
authority given for the purpose of detecting and punishing crime, and not for the making of
criminals, deserves the severest condemnation"); Flamm, 338 N.W.2d at 828-29 (allowing
that a jury may find that police have improperly influenced a defendant, or if no facts are in
dispute, the court may find so "as a matter of law").
18. See Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1541 (suggesting that if Jacobson had merely been
offered an opportunity to order illegal materials through the mails, a jury instruction on
entrapment would probably not have been warranted); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11(2)
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for the purpose of making an arrest is not tolerable police con-
duct.19 Entrapment law history traces the varying attempts to dif-
ferentiate between the acceptable use of deception to apprehend
criminals and the unacceptable creation of crime.2 °
B. SUBJECTIVE ENTRAPMENT THEORY
Entrapment law in the federal courts and most state jurisdic-
tions follows an approach first articulated by the United States
Supreme Court sixty years ago in Sorrells v. United States,2' a case
involving the violation of federal prohibition laws.22 The Sorrells
court overturned a conviction because the defendant had pro-
vided illegal liquor only to silence the persistent pleading of an
(1993) (providing that "[c]onduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an
offense does not constitute entrapment").
19. See, e.g.,Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540.
20. See Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 164-70 (1976).
Since entrapment has not been given constitutional status, states may adopt their own
definitions. State v. Pfister, 264 N.W.2d 694, 696 n.2 (N.D. 1978).
21. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
22. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442-52 (1932). Earlier, several federal
circuit courts had recognized an entrapment defense. See, e.g., Butts v. United States, 273
F. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921). The Butts court found fatal error in the trial court's failure to
instruct the jury on entrapment and stated that the "first duties of the officers of the law are
to prevent, not to punish crime." Id. The court anticipated the subjective standard for
entrapment when it wrote:
Here the evidence strongly tends to prove, if it does not conclusively do so, that
[the law officers'] first and chief endeavor was to cause, to create, crime in order
to punish it, and it is unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and to the
established law of the land to punish a man for the commission of an offense of
the like of which he had never been guilty, either in thought or in deed, and
evidently never would have been guilty of if the officers of the law had not
inspired, incited, persuaded, and lured him to attempt to commit it.
Id.
The first federal appeals court to find entrapment did so in a case involving the smug-
gling of Chinese aliens into the United States. Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th
Cir. 1915). The determining factor for the finding of entrapment in Woo Wai was the fact
that the crime originated in the minds of the police officers. Id. at 415. It took a great deal
of persistence by the officers to get Woo Wai to act illegally. Id. at 413-414.
An earlier federal entrapment case involved the laws prohibiting the sale of liquor to
Native Americans. United States v. Healy, 202 F. 349 (D. Mont. 1913). In Healy, the court
found that in hiring a Native American who lacked typical Native American features to buy
liquor from an unwary seller, the officers had acted intolerably and that "a conviction for an
offense so procured cannot stand." Id. at 351.
A case involving the use of a fictitious person to induce the illegal mailing of material
pertaining to birth control inspired two opinions offering different reasons for quashing the
indictment. United States v. Whittier, 28 F. Cas. 591 (E.D. Mo. 1878) (No. 16,688). The
Whittier court found that since the illegal matter was not sent to any real person, the act of
mailing it did not fall within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 593. This opinion antici-
pated the statutory approach of the Sorrells majority. See discussion at notes 26-31 and
accompanying text. In a concurring opinion in Whittier, District Judge Treat wrote: "[t]he
sense of indignation against such vocation or conduct should not permit a violation by the
courts of established rules of law, or an unlawful exercise of jurisdiction, nor the counte-
nance of unlawful contrivances to induce or manufacture crime." Id. at 594 (Treat, J., con-
curring). Judge Treat's analysis presages the integrity-of-the-courts justification for the
Brandeis/Roberts approach to entrapment discussed infra II. D. 1.
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undercover agent who had represented himself to be a fellow
World War I veteran of the same division.2 3 The majority of the
Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, adopted what is
known as the subjective standard for entrapment.24 Under this
standard, entrapment occurs when the crime originates by the
design of law enforcement officers who then "implant in the mind
of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged
offense and induce its commission in order that they may
prosecute. 25
The Sorrells majority justified its entrapment finding by statu-
tory interpretation.26 The Court refused to apply the "letter" of
the prohibition law to situations in which otherwise innocent peo-
ple are lured by government officials into the commission of
crimes.2 7 Recognizing precedent which condemned the "[1]iteral
interpretation of statutes at the expense of the reason of the law
* . . producing absurd consequences or flagrant injustice[,] ' ' 28 the
Court reasoned that Congress does not enact a criminal statute
with the intent that a statute's "processes of detection and
enforcement" would be abused.29  Furthermore, the Sorrells
majority declined to construe a criminal statute to require finding
the defendant guilty and yet immune from prosecution. 30 Clem-
ency, the Court reasoned, was an executive, not a judicial,
prerogative. 3'
Several times, the United States Supreme Court has reaf-
firmed its allegiance to the subjective approach to entrapment and
its focus on the defendant's predisposition toward crime.32 In its
23. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 440-41.
24. Id. at 451 (stating that the defendant who pleads entrapment "cannot complain of
an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing
upon that issue"). The United States Supreme Court's first use of the terms subjective and
objective was in a dissenting opinion by Justice Stewart in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423, 440-445 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting). For an analysis of these terms and citations to
entrapment scholarship, see Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 228-29 (Alaska 1969).
25. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442.
26. Id. at 446-51.
27. Id. at 448. According to Chief Justice Hughes, the Court was "not forced by the
letter to do violence to the spirit and purpose of the statute." Id.
28. Id. at 446.
29. Id. at 448.
30. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 449.
31. Id.
32. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1992) (overturning a conviction for
the illegal mailordering of child pornography); Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 59-60
(1988) (finding it legally permissible for defendants to plead both entrapment and not
guilty); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976) (refusing to find entrapment
based on the pervasive conduct of the police in a crime for which the defendant was
predisposed); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973) (denying an entrapment
finding to a defendant whom the police had supplied with a necessary ingredient for the
manufacture of narcotics); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373-78 (1958)
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most recent entrapment case, Jacobson v. United States,33 the
Court overturned a conviction for the illegal purchase of child por-
nography because the government failed to prove that Jacobson
was disposed to act illegally prior to its initiating contact with
him.34 Jacobson was charged under the Child Protection Act of
1984 for illegally purchasing child pornography through the
mail.35 Although he had purchased some child pornography prior
to the effective date of the Act, Jacobson's violation of the Act
occurred after more than two years of pressure from federal law
enforcement agencies.36 These agencies, through various fictitious
organizations, used the mail to persuade Jacobson to purchase the
illegal materials.37 The mailings included strong suggestions that
his purchase would aid in obtaining legislation to protect personal
freedoms, including freedom of the press.38 In a five to four deci-
sion, the Court held that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain
the jury's finding that Jacobson was predisposed to violate the law
prior to the mailings.3 9
As outlined by the Supreme Court, entrapment is an affirma-
tive defense to be decided by the jury "unless it can be decided as
a matter of law."'4°  Courts analyze the subjective entrapment
defense in two steps.41  First, the defendant must show that the
government induced the crime. 42 In order to justify the induce-
ment, the government must then prove "beyond reasonable
doubt" that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.43
(overturning a conviction for purchasing heroin for a government agent who played on the
weakness of a recovering addict by, among other tactics, feigning withdrawal symptoms).
33. 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
34. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1992).
35. Id. at 1537.
36. Id. at 1538.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1543.
40. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 377 (1958).
41. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988).
42. id.
43. Id. See also Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540. Thirty-six states have settled exclusively
on some form of the subjective standard. They are Alabama, Lambeth v. State, 562 So. 2d
575, 577-78 (Ala. 1990); Arizona, State v. Boccelli, 467 P.2d 740, 741-42 (Ariz. 1970);
Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-209(b) (Michie 1987) (describing a "normal law-abiding
persons" test which is interpreted to still require inquiry into the defendant's predisposition
in Spears v. State, 568 S.W.2d 492, 501 (Ark. 1978); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-
1-709 (West 1986); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-15 (West 1985); Delaware,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 43 2(a) (1987); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25 (1990); Idaho,
State v. Hansen, 673 P.2d 416, 417 (Idaho 1983); Illinois, People v. Spahr, 371 N.E.2d 1261,
1264 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-9 (Burns 1985); Kansas, KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3210 (1988); Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 505.010 (Michie 1990);
Louisiana, State v. Batiste, 363 So. 2d 639, 642 (La. 1978); Maine, State v. Matheson, 363
A.2d 716, 722 (Me. 1976); Maryland, Sparks v. State, 603 A.2d 1258, 1264-65 (Md. Ct. App.
1992), cert. denied, 610 A.2d 797 (Md. 1992); Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Shuman,
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Courts analyzing entrapment under the subjective theory dif-
fer over whether the government is required to prove that an
induced defendant was predisposed to commit the particular
crime being charged or whether it must merely prove that the
defendant was predisposed to commit the type of crime being
charged.44 If the court requires proof of predisposition to the par-
ticular crime being charged, the government may be restricted in
the types of evidence it uses to prove predisposition. 45 If the gov-
ernment need only prove that the defendant was predisposed to
commit a type of crime in order to justify the entrapment, evi-
dence of the defendant's prior behavior, whether it resulted in
conviction or not, may be used.46
C. THE OUTRAGEOUS POLICE CONDUCT DEFENSE
In United States v. Russell,47 the United States Supreme Court
made it clear that the entrapment defense will only succeed in the
federal system when the government "implants the criminal
design in the mind of the defendant. ' 48 However, Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the majority, left open the possibility that the
Court "may someday be presented with a situation in which the
conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due pro-
cess principles would absolutely bar the government from invok-
462 N.E.2d 80, 84 (Mass. 1984); Minnesota, State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89,107 (Minn. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1132 (1981); Mississippi, Pulliam v. State, 592 So. 2d 24, 26 (Miss.
1991); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 562.066 (Vernon 1979); Montana, MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-2-213 (1993); Nebraska, State v. Stahl, 482 N.W.2d 829, 838 (Neb. 1992); Nevada,
Shrader v. State, 706 P.2d 834, 835 (Nev. 1985); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 626:5 (1986); North Carolina, State v. Hageman, 296 S.E.2d 433, 447 (N.C. 1982); Ohio,
State v. Doran, 449 N.E.2d 1295, 1298 (Ohio 1983); Oklahoma, Davidson v. State, 621 P.2d
1166, 1168 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 161.275 (1991);
Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 313(a) (1983 & Supp. 1993); Rhode Island, State v.
Jones, 416 A.2d 676, 679 (R.I. 1980); South Carolina, State v. Johnson, 367 S.E.2d 700, 701
(S.C. 1988); South Dakota, State v. Goodroad, 442 N.W.2d 246, 249 (S.D. 1989); Tennessee,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-505 (1991); Virginia, Stamper v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d
682, 687 (Va. 1985); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.070 (West 1988);
Wisconsin, State v. Saternus, 381 N.W.2d 290, 294-95 (Wis. 1986); Wyoming, Wright v.
State, 851 P.2d 12, 14 (Wyo. 1993).
44. See State v. Knight 230 S.E.2d 732, 737 (W. Va. 1976) (stating that the question for
the jury in entrapment cases is "whether the design of the crime originated in the mind of
the accused or in the mind of the officer or agent"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-709 (1986)
(requiring that the defendant "would not have conceived of or engaged in conduct of the
sort induced") (emphasis added).
45. See, e.g., Knight, 230 S.E.2d at 737 (stating that "[t]he mere fact that an
entrapment defense is available to the defendant is no justification for changing our
recognized rules of evidence").
46. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 654 P.2d 319, 322 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (approving of
the trial court's admission of hearsay testimony about the defendant's previous dealings in
stolen goods "for the limited purposes of showing the 'intent' of the detectives").
47. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
48. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973).
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ing judicial processes to obtain a conviction .... ,,49 Nevertheless,
the Court decided that the police conduct in supplying Russell
with a hard-to-get and necessary ingredient for the manufacture of
methamphetamine was not so outrageous that it violated the
defendant's due process rights.5 °
Since Russell, several federal defendants have attempted to
argue an outrageous conduct defense in entrapment-type situa-
tions in which their predisposition prevents them from succeeding
on the entrapment defense. 1 In that time, however, it appears
that the outrageous conduct defense has succeeded only once at
the federal appeals court level.52 In United States v. Twigg,53 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that
supplying almost all of the necessary ingredients for the manufac-
ture of narcotics, supplying the building which housed the labora-
tory, supplying the know-how for the manufacturing process, and
maintaining a level of control over the operation constituted out-
rageous government involvement. 54
49. Id. at 431-32 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)).
50. Id. at 432.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Crump, 934 F.2d 947, 957 (8th Cir. 1991). In Crump, the
Eight Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's argument that the Drug
Enforcement Agency's decision to target him for prosecution when it had no way of
knowing that he continued to be involved in drugs "was so outrageous as to violate due
process." Id. The court reasoned that due process issues only arise when constitutional
rights are implicated and that Crump had no constitutional right to be free from
undercover investigations. Id.
In an unpublished 1990 opinion found on WESTLAW®, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that "[a]lthough this [outrageous conduct] defense has been raised numerous
times, only two decisions from any circuit have dismissed indictments based on such a
defense." United States v. Wegman, No. 89-10145, 1990 WL 170409 at *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 6,
1990) (unpublished at 917 F.2d 1307) (footnote omitted). Even with a diligent search, this
researcher could find no other successful outrageous conduct defenses at the federal circuit
court level.
However, there are examples of successful outrageous conduct defenses at the federal
district court level. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 808 F. Supp. 77, 79-86 (Mass. Dist. Ct.
1992) rev'd, No. 93-1393, 1993 WL 345746 (1st Cir. Sept. 16, 1993). In Santana, the Federal
District Court of Massachusetts found that when the government had given a sample of
13.3 grams of ninety-two percent pure heroin to a suspect and this heroin was not
recovered, the "outrageous conduct" of the government necessitated dismissal. Id. at 86.
In reversing the decision, the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "[a]lthough law
enforcement officers might well profit from reading the lower court's thoughtful opinion,
we conclude that the court exceeded its authority." United States v. Santana, No. 93-1393,
1993 WL 345746 (1st Cir. Sept. 16, 1993).
52. United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
53. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
54. Twigg, 588 F.2d at 380-81. In a case decided the year before Russell, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a government agent's reinstatement and operation of a
once shut down bootlegging syndicate constituted "creative activity" requiring reversal of
convictions. Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1971).
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D. THE OBJECTIVE THEORIES OF ENTRAPMENT
1. Entrapment theory as described in minority United
States Supreme Court opinions (hereinafter the
Brandeis/Roberts approach)
The Jacobson case marked the first time that all nine justices
of the United States Supreme Court relied on the subjective stan-
dard for entrapment. 55 Prior toJacobson, strong minorities on the
Court rejected the majority's focus on the predisposition of the
defendant and advocated a theory of entrapment which focused
on the conduct of the police. 6 Indeed, the first Supreme Court
opinion to advocate using entrapment theory to overturn a convic-
tion came in a dissent five years before the Sorrells decision.57 In
Casey v. United States,5" Justice Brandeis advocated dismissal
based on government misconduct.59 He wrote that an obstacle to
prosecution arose when "the alleged crime was instigated by
officers of the Government. 60
Casey, a lawyer, was convicted of purchasing morphine for a
prisoner whom he had been asked by the jailer to visit.6 The
money that the prisoner gave Casey for the purchase of morphine
was provided by federal narcotics officers.62 The majority, in an
opinion by Justice Holmes, reasoned that there was ample evi-
dence for the jury to find that the government had probable cause
to entrap Casey.63 The majority was "not persuaded that the con-
duct of the officials was different from or worse than ordering a
55. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992) (requiring that the
prosecution "prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit
the criminal act prior to first being approached by Government agents"); Id. at 1543
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the government's contention that "a reasonable
jury could permissibly infer beyond a reasonable doubt that [Jacobson] was predisposed to
commit the crime").
56. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 498-99 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that when the subjective test for entrapment allows government agents to both
sell to and buy back the same contraband from a suspect, it is essentially allowing the
rounding up and jailing of all "predisposed" individuals); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423, 440-41 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (rejecting the subjective approach to entrapment
in favor of the objective approach of Justice Roberts in Sorrells and Justice Frankfurter in
Sherman); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(arguing against the subjective standard adopted by the majority because "[p]ermissible
police activity does not vary according to the particular defendant concerned"); Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453-59 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring); Casey v. United States,
276 U.S. 413, 421-25 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
57. Casey, 276 U.S. at 421-25 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
58. 276 U.S. 413 (1928).
59. Casey 276 U.S. at 421-25 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 423 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 419.
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drink of a suspected bootlegger."6 4
In dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that "[i]f Casey is guilty of
the crime of purchasing 3.4 grains of morphine, . . . it is because he
yielded to the temptation presented by the officers." 6 5 According
to Justice Brandeis, the conduct of the officers was no defense for
Casey.66 "But," he argued, "it does not follow that the court must
suffer a detective-made criminal to be punished. '67 To Brandeis,
the prosecution should not have been allowed because the purity
of the courts must be preserved and the government must be pro-
tected "from illegal conduct of its officers."1
6 8
Five years later, in Sorrells v. United States,6 9 Justice Brandeis
joined Justice Roberts in a special concurrence which rejected the
majority's reliance on the defendant's lack of predisposition. 0
Instead, it proposed an approach to entrapment that focused on
the conduct of government agents.7 ' In his concurrence, Justice
Roberts found fault with the Court's addition of the implied ele-
ment of entrapment to criminal statutes, stating that it amounted
to a "strained and unwarranted construction" and to "judicial
amendment. ' 72 The result of the Court's finding, he reasoned,
was that some defendants who commit crimes by acting directly
contrary to the express provisions of a statute were, nevertheless,
not guilty by reason of the same statute.73 By further construing
the statute "as removing the defense of entrapment" from the
predisposed defendant, Justice Roberts argued, the Court was
allowing convictions based, not on the actual statutory violation
charged, but on prior reputation.74 He reasoned that the proof of
predisposition would necessarily rest on the defendant's reputa-
tion prior to his being induced to commit the crime.75 Thus, Jus-
tice Roberts suggested, the guilt or innocence of the entrapped
defendant would be decided based on past wrongs or percep-
64. Casey, 276 U.S. at 419.
65. Id. at 423 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 425 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
69. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
70. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453-59 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 456 (Roberts, J., concurring). According to Justice Roberts, adding an implied
element of entrapment to a statute "amounts to saying that one who with full intent
commits the act defined by law as an offense is nevertheless by virtue of the unspoken and
implied mandate of the statute to be adjudged not guilty by reason of someone's else [sic]
improper conduct." Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 458 (Roberts, J., concurring).
75. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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tions.76 He argued that entrapment "[v]iewed in its true light" is
no defense to those whose actions and intent fall within the defini-
tion of criminal statutes.7 According to Justice Roberts, the Court
had adopted "a form of words to justify action which ought to be
based on the inherent right of the court not to be made the instru-
ment of wrong." 78
Entrapment occurs, according to Justice Roberts, when a law
officer conceives and plans an offense and then procures its com-
mission by someone "who would not have [committed] it except
for the [officer's] trickery, persuasion, or fraud ..... 9 Using this
theory of entrapment, the guilt of the defendant is not relevant
because the sole reason for quashing the indictment is that the
crime was brought about by police misconduct.8 ° This approach
to entrapment, in which the focus of inquiry is on the conduct of
the police rather than on the predisposition of the defendant, has
become known as the objective standard.8 '
Although the majority in Sorrells considered entrapment to
be an affirmative defense for the jury,8 2 Justice Roberts would
have required that prosecution end and a defendant be released
whenever entrapment was found to have occurred.8 3 Public pol-
icy, according to Justice Roberts, required a court to preserve "the
purity of its own temple" and to "protect itself and the govern-
ment from such prostitution of the criminal law." 4 He analogized
the duty of the courts in entrapment cases to the duty of the courts
in civil actions to refuse to "tolerate the use of their process to
consummate" wrongs.8 5
76. Id. at 456 (Roberts, J., concurring). See also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
443-44 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In his Russell dissent, Justice Stewart argues that "this
subjective test means that the Government is permitted to entrap a person with a criminal
record or bad reputation, and then to prosecute him for the manufactured crime, confident
that his record or reputation itself will be enough to show that he was predisposed to
commit the offense anyway." Id.
77. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 456 (Roberts, J., concurring).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 454 (Roberts, J., concurring). For similar reasoning, see United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 445 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that entrapment occurs
when government conduct induces "a crime by one not ready and willing to commit it");
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 384 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (reasoning
that the "power of government is abused.., when employed to promote rather than detect
crime and to bring about the downfall of those who, left to themselves, might well have
obeyed the law").
80. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457-59 (Roberts, J., concurring).
81. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 441 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
82. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451-52.
83. Id. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring) (suggesting further that the jury should be used
only in determining the facts).
84. Id. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 455 (Roberts, J., concurring).
978 [Vol. 69:969
CASE COMMENT
Following the reasoning of Justice Roberts, Justice Stewart
declared over forty years later that the important question regard-
ing entrapment is "whether the Government's conduct in induc-
ing the crime was beyond judicial toleration. '86 In his dissent in
United States v. Russell,87 Justice Stewart argued that "the institu-
tional integrity of the system of federal criminal justice" required
protection by the federal courts.88 Therefore, under the objective
theory, entrapment would not be a matter for the jury unless
there was a factual dispute concerning the officers' conduct.8 9
To summarize, the Brandeis/Roberts objective approach to
entrapment would be a matter for the court, not the jury.90 If the
court decides that law enforcement officers manufactured a crime
by instigating it and then inducing its commission by someone
"'who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, per-
suasion, or fraud of the officer," 9' the court must refuse to allow
prosecution.92 The underlying reason for this refusal is to protect
the integrity of the judicial system.93
Although no jurisdiction in the United States completely relies
on the Brandeis/Roberts definition of entrapment, 94 at least two
jurisdictions recognize it as one definition of entrapment. In State
v. Talbot,9 5 the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the "manu-
facture or creation of a crime by law enforcement authorities can-
not be tolerated."96 For the New Jersey court, if the "criminal
conduct, from beginning to end, was the product of the creative
activity of the police[,]" entrapment has occurred as a matter of
law.9" In Cruz v. State,9" the Florida Supreme Court established as
a first prong of its objective standard for entrapment that police
show that their activity had "as its end the interruption of a spe-
86. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 443 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
87. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
88. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 445 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
89. Id.
90. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
91. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 434, 454 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring) (concluding that "[p]roof of entrapment, at any
stage of the case, requires the court to stop the prosecution, direct that the indictment be
quashed, and the defendant set at liberty").
93. Id. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring).
94. Although the Virginia Supreme Court "adopted the definition of entrapment given
by the concurring opinion of Justice Roberts in Sorrells[,]" its analysis of the entrapment
defense included consideration of the defendant's "predisposition and propensity to
commit [a crime]." Stamper v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E. 2d 682, 687 (Va. 1985).
95. 364 A.2d 9 (NJ. 1976)
96. State v. Talbot, 364 A.2d 9, 13 (NJ. 1976).
97. Id.
98. 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1985).
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cific ongoing criminal activity." 99 The justification for this prong
was that although "[p]olice must fight this war" on the criminal
classes, they must "not engage in the manufacture of new hostili-
ties."' 00 Courts in both Florida and New Jersey recognize objec-
tive entrapment defenses to be decided as a matter of law along
with subjective entrapment defenses to be decided as a matter of
fact.101
2. The "Hypothetical Person"'12 Objective Approach to
Entrapment Law
Another type of objective approach to entrapment is one in
which the acceptability of the police conduct is measured by its
effect on a hypothetical person.10 3 This approach was anticipated
by Justice Frankfurter in a special concurrence in Sherman v.
United States.10 4 Justice Frankfurter argued for an entrapment
theory based on illegal police activity, stating that "certain police
conduct to ensnare. .. is not to be tolerated by an advanced soci-
ety.' 1 5 But, he reasoned:
[t]his does not mean that the police may not act so as
to detect those engaged in criminal conduct and ready
and willing to commit further crimes should the occasion
arise. Such indeed is their obligation. It does mean that
in holding out inducements they should act in such a
manner as is likely to induce to the commission of crime
only these persons and not others who would normally
avoid crime and through self-struggle resist ordinary
temptations.'0 6
99. Cruz v. State, 465 So. 2d 516, 522 (Fla. 1985)superseded by statute as recognized in
Munoz v. State, No. 78,900, 1993 WL 406367, at *9 (Fla. Oct. 14, 1993).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 521; Talbot, 364 A.2d at 12-13. Jurisdictions which apply a hybrid of the
subjective and objective theories of entrapment are discussed infra Part II. E.
102. The term "'hypothetical-person' approach" was taken from Roger Park, The
Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 165-66 (1976).
103. Id. at 171-176. States using this type of objective standard for entrapment are:
Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.450 (1989); California, People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947, 955(Cal. 1979); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-237 (1985); Iowa, State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d
375, 382 (Iowa 1974); Michigan, People v. Juillet, 475 N.W.2d 786, 793-94 (Mich. 1991);
Texas, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.06(a)(West 1989); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303(1)
(1990); Vermont, State v. George, 602 A.2d 953, 955 (Vt. 1991).
104. 356 U.S. 369, 383-84 (1958). See also 1 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 316-17 (1970).
105. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 383-84 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). It should be noted that Justice
Frankfurter voted to reverse Sherman's conviction. Id. at 378. Also, the hypothetical
person approach, as practiced in some jurisdictions, would be of doubtful aid to a defendant
similar to Sherman since someone with a history of heroin addiction may not be as able to
resist inducement as well as a normally law-abiding person. Cf. State v. Boushee, 284
980 [Vol. 69:969
19931 CASE COMMENT 981
The hypothetical person is usually described as either a person
not ready to commit the offense, 107 an average person,'0 8 or a nor-
mal law-abiding person.'0 9 For courts applying this standard, the
focus is on the activity of the police," 0 just as it is with the Bran-
deis/Roberts approach to entrapment."' However, this standard
differs from the Brandeis/Roberts approach in that it defines
police conduct as intolerable only if that conduct would induce the
hypothetical person to commit the crime for which the defendant
is charged." 12
The hypothetical person objective standard was conceived as
a standard to be applied by the court, not the jury." 3 Although in
several jurisdictions the court applies the hypothetical person stan-
dard, 1 4 in some, including North Dakota while it used the hypo-
thetical person standard, juries apply the standard." 5  In North
N.W.2d 423, 432-33 (N.D. 1979) (discussing the denial of a request to have the jury
instructed to use a "'normally law-abiding drug user"' instead of a normal law-abiding
person standard).
According to one commentater:
"It seems unlikely that the "average person" language... and the Brown
commission commentary really intended to endow the hypothetical person with
the strength of character possessed by an average person. Such an
interpretation would seem to require conviction in Sherman v. United States,
where all of the Justices agreed that entrapment had been conclusively
established.
Park, supra note 102, at 173-74.
107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See also People v.
Jamieson, 461 N.W.2d 884, 891 (Mich. 1990).
108. Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alaska 1969).
109. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11(2) (1985).
110. E.g., State v. Mees, 272 N.W.2d 284, 289 (N.D. 1978) (amended by § 12.1-05-11
(Supp. 1993)).
111. See supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the focus of the
Brandeis/ Roberts approach to entrapment.
112. See City of Bismarck v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d 789, 796 (N.D. 1989) (finding that
officers had not induced the crime of disorderly conduct because their conduct was not of
the type "which would cause a 'normally law-abiding person to commit the offense' ");
WORKING PAPERS, supra, note 104, at 306 (defining the entrapment issue as "framed... in
the objective terms of whether persons at large who would not otherwise have done so
would have been encouraged by the government's actions to engage in crime").
113. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 104, at 325.
114. See, e.g., Cruz v. State, 465 So. 2d 516, 521 (Fla. 1985) superseded by statute as
recognized in Munoz v. State, No. 78,900, 1993 WL 406367, at *9 (Fla. Oct. 14, 1993).
115. State v. Pfister, 264 N.W.2d 694, 700 (N.D. 1978). North Dakota adopted the
objective standard for entrapment by legislative action in 1973. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
05-11 (1985) (amended by § 12.1-05-11 (Supp. 1993)). That statute defined entrapment as
follows:
1. It is an affirmative defense that the defendant was entrapped into
committing the offense.
2. Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement agent induces the commission
of an offense, using persuasion or other means likely to cause normally law-
abiding persons to commit the offense. Conduct merely affording a person an
opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
3. In this section "law enforcement agent" includes personnel of federal and
local law enforcement agencies as well as state agencies, and any person
cooperating with such an agency.
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Dakota at the time of the Kummer decision, entrapment was by
statute an affirmative defense which required the defendant to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence" 6 that a law enforce-
ment agent induced the commission of a crime by using methods
that would induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the
offense. "17
Generally, the North Dakota Supreme Court articulated the
test for objective entrapment as a two-part process."" The first
inquiry under this test was whether law enforcement agents
induced the commission of a crime." 9 The second element in the
objective entrapment equation required a finding that the law
enforcement conduct in question would have induced a "normal
law-abiding person" to commit the crime at issue.' 21 It is unclear
whether the first of the articulated elements of this test, that the
defendant was induced, was really a separate element because the
North Dakota Supreme Court only defined inducement in terms
of the second element. 12 ' For example, in a 1989 case, City of
Bismarck v. Nassif, the supreme court found no evidence that the
defendant was induced to commit the crime because the actions of
Id.
Prior to the statute, the only reported North Dakota law relating to entrapment was in
a case in which the state supreme court recognized the possibility of denying a conviction
when a law enforcement agent has prompted, urged, or led "in the commission of the
offense." State v. Currie, 102 N.W. 875, 877 (N.D. 1905). However, the court found that
the defendant had participated fully and willingly in all the elements of the crime of bur-
glary in a Minto, North Dakota, store and that the undercover detective, although feigning
complicity, had not made any of the important decisions toward carrying the crime for-
ward. Id.
116. Pfister, 264 N.W.2d at 699. The Pfister court found that entrapment must be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence because it is an affirmative defense. Id. at 699.
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11(1) (1985) (defining entrapment as an affirmative
defense); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-03(3) (1985) (amended by § 12.1-05-11 (Supp. 1993))
(requiring that affirmative defenses be proved by a "preponderance of evidence").
In Pfister, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded a conviction for
new trial because the trial judge had erroneously instructed the jury on the subjective
standard for entrapment when he stated that the defense "involved the issue of 'whether
the defendant was ready and willing to commit the crime without persuasion.' " Pfister,
264 N.W.2d at 698.
117. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11(2X1985) (amended by § 12.1-05-11 (Supp. 1993)).
A "law enforcement agent" includes anyone cooperating with a federal or local law
enforcement agency. Id. at § 12.1-05-11(3).
118. See Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 441; State v. Pfister, 264 N.W.2d 694, 698 (N.D.
1978). The Pfister court explained:
Under this statute, entrapment exists when two factors occur: (1) a law
enforcement agent induces the commission of a crime; and (2) the method by
which the law enforcement agent induces the commission of the crime is a
method "likely to cause normally law-abiding persons to commit the offense."
Id. See also State v. Mees, 272 N.W.2d 284, 289 (N.D. 1978) (overturning a bench trial
verdict because the defendants had not "received the benefits of the two-part test").
119. See, e.g., Pfister, 264 N.W.2d at 698.
120. Id.
121. City of Bismarck v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d 789, 796 (N.D. 1989).
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the police officers were not of "the type of conduct which would
cause 'normally law-abiding persons to commit the offense.' 1122
The court's definition of entrapment in State v. Berger, a 1979
case, also suggested that there really was no separate element of
inducement in North Dakota's objective entrapment law.' 23
According to Berger, the test for entrapment was "what a normally
law-abiding person would do under the circumstances, with the
focus being on the conduct of the law enforcement agents. 124
E. HYBRID SUBJECTIVE/OBJECTIVE APPROACHES TO
ENTRAPMENT LAW
Recognizing different policy reasons for the differing
approaches to entrapment law, some courts choose to apply a com-
bination of the subjective and objective theories. 125 In two juris-
dictions, the hybrid approach was generated completely from the
courts. 126 Three jurisdictions, however, now utilize the hybrid
approach because the courts have considered their own objective
tests for entrapment along with subjective standards provided by
statute.
127
122. Id. The defendant had called 911 because his car had been vandalized. Id. at
791. When the police arrived, the defendant was "upset, shouting, loud, and aggressive."
Id. Unable to calm the defendant, the police eventually arrested him for disorderly
conduct. Id. The court rejected an entrapment claim based on the police officers'
unresponsiveness to a man they knew to be "in an emotional state." Id. at 796. The court
reasoned that police failure to give names or badge numbers would not induce " normally
law-abiding persons to commit"' disorderly conduct. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 796 (quoting
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1985)).
123. State v. Berger, 285 N.W.2d 533, 539 (N. D. 1979).
124. Id.
125. Jurisdictions found to have some form of hybrid subjective/objective approaches
to entrapment law are: Florida, Munoz v. State, No. 78,900, 1993 WL 406367, at *13 (Fla.
Oct. 14, 1993); New Jersey, State v. Johnson, 606 A.2d 315, 320 (N.J. 1992); New Mexico,
Baca v. State, 742 P.2d 1043, 1045-46 (N.M. 1987); New York, People v. Isaacson, 378
N.E.2d 78, 83-85 (N.Y. 1978); West Virginia, State v. Knight, 230 S.E.2d 732, 736-37 (W. Va.
1976). In Isaacson, the New York Court of Appeals examined police conduct under state
constitutional due process, expressly distinguishing it from entrapment theory. 378 N.E.2d
at 84-85. Nevertheless, the court began its analysis by considering whether police were
involved in "the manufacture and creation of crime." Id. at 83. Because entrapment law
historically has been concerned with government creating crime for the purposes of
prosecution, the New York court's due process analysis appears to provide an objective
theory of entrapment.
126. See State v. Sheetz, 825 P.2d 614, 617 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Knight, 230
S.E.2d 732, 736-37 (W. Va. 1976).
127. See Cruz v. State, 465 So. 2d 516, 521 (Fla. 1985) superseded by statute as
recognized in Munoz v. State, No. 78,900, 1993 WL 406367, at *9 (Fla. Oct. 14, 1993); State
v. Johnson, 606 A.2d 315, 320 (NJ. 1992); People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83-85 (N.Y.
1978). Interestingly, North Dakota's new subjective entrapment statute contains language
similar to the language of the statutes in two of these states, New Jersey and Florida.
Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (Supp. 1993) with N.J. STAT. ANN § 2C:2-12 (West
1982) and FLA. STAT. ANN § 777-201 (West 1992). Indeed, the legislative history for the
new North Dakota statute indicates an interest in "[enacting] an entrapment statute that
codifies the subjective theory of entrapment such as those interpreted in Colorado and
Florida." Hearings on Senate Bills 2171 and 2058, Testimony prepared by the North
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In spite of common law which required lack of predisposition
for entrapment, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that entrap-
ment as a matter of law occurs when police furnish narcotics to a
defendant and then buy back those same narcotics.12 8  Subse-
quently, the New Jersey legislature enacted a statute requiring the
subjective standard for the affirmative entrapment defense.129
Nevertheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court continues to recog-
nize an objective entrapment defense based on "due process and
fundamental fairness.' 130 The New Jersey objective entrapment
defense was founded in the New Jersey state constitution.' 31 New
York's highest court also found due process entrapment on state
constitutional grounds.' 32 In People v. Isaacson, 13 3 the New York
Court of Appeals exhibited concern for fairness and for the integ-
rity of the courts and the police. 134
Policy considerations and fairness guided the Florida Supreme
Court to a finding "that the subjective and objective entrapment
doctrines can coexist.' 35 That court adopted a two-part "thresh-
old objective test" for entrapment to be decided by the court
Dakota Legislative Council staff for Senator Nelson 3, (March 1992). Florida courts have
interpreted its statute to continue the viability of an objective entrapment defense. Munoz
v. State, No. 78,900, 1993 WL 406367, at *13 (Oct. 14, 1993). Thus, it is not completely
certain that North Dakota's new subjective entrapment defense precludes North Dakota
courts from applying their own objective entrapment analysis in accordance with the
Kummer decision. See Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 444 (finding illegal police conduct was
entrapment as a matter of law). At the same time the legislature enacted the new
entrapment law, it enacted a law making it legal for the police to use forfeited narcotics to
facilitate drug enforcement. N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-36(5Xe) (Supp. 1993). That the
legislature found it necessary to legalize the use of narcotics found to be illegal in Kummer
could suggest that it did not consider its new entrapment law to overrule the underlying
basis for the Kummer holding, that illegal police activity in manufacturing crime is
entrapment as a matter of law. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 441.
128. State v. Talbot, 364 A.2d 9, 13 (N.J. 1976).
129. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:2-12 (West 1982).
130. State v. Johnson, 606 A.2d 315, 320 (N.J. 1992).
131. Id. at 322. See also N.J. CONST., art. I, para. 2. ("All political power is inherent in
the people. Government is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the people,
and they have the right at all times to alter or reform the same, whenever the public good
may require it.").
According to Johnson, the relevant factors to consider in due process entrapment are:
(1) whether the government or the defendant was primarily responsible for
creating and planning the crime, (2) whether the government or the defendant
primarily controlled and directed the commission of the crime, (3) whether
objectively viewed the methods used by the government to involve the
defendant in the commission of the crime were unreasonable, and (4) whether
the government had a legitimate law enforcement purpose in bringing about the
crime.
Johnson, 606 A.2d at 323.
132. People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1978).
133. 378 N.E. 2d 78 (N.Y. 1978).
134. People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E. 2d 82 (N.Y. 1978).
135. Cruz v. State, 465 So. 2d 516, 520-21 (Fla. 1985) superseded by statute as
recognized in Munoz v. State, No. 78,900, 1993 WL 406367, at *9 (Fla. Oct. 14, 1993).
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before the defendant may be required to prove a subjective the-
ory of entrapment to the trier of fact.' 36
F. REVERSE STINGS AND ENTRAPMENT LAW
Courts generally recognize that police must use deceptive tac-
tics in order to effectively discover and apprehend certain
criminals.' 37 An accepted tactic is the sting operation in which
police pose as potential victims or willing co-participants in
crime. 3 The typical example of a sting has law enforcement
agents posing as drug buyers in order to ferret out the sources and
sellers of narcotics.' 3 9 However, when the police actually supply
the narcotics, or other criminal means, this is called a reverse
sting, and some courts are more wary of enforcing the results of
the police operation. 140 The typical reverse sting has the police
offering illegal drugs for sale and then arresting the willing
purchasers. ' 4'
Although reverse stings are recognized as ordinary police con-
duct in some localities, 142 several courts have shown that there are
limits to the amount of police involvement in crime which will be
tolerated.14 3 Some courts have found that when one law enforce-
ment agent supplies the contraband to a suspect and then another
136. Id. at 521-22. The first part of the Florida court's objective standard required the
court to decide whether the police intended "the interruption of a specific ongoing
criminal activity" and that their means were "'reasonably tailored to apprehend those
involved." Id. at 522. The second prong of this objective test asked the court to consider
whether the inducement "'create[d] a substantial risk that such an offense [would] be
commited by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.'" Id. (quoting Model
Penal Code § 2.13 (1962)).
Since Cruz, the Florida legislature revised its entrapment statute. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 777.201 (West 1992). Although Florida maintains some form of objective standard based
on the state constitution, it is unclear how much of the Cruz test remains viable. See Munoz
v. State, No. 78,900, 1993 WL 406367, at **9-13 (Fla. Oct. 14, 1993).
137. See, e.g., State v. Overby, 497 N.W.2d 408, 414 (N.D. 1993).
138. See State v. James, 484 N.W.2d 799, 800-01 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
139. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1541 (1992).
140. See Moore v. State, 534 So. 2d 557, 559-60 (Miss. 1988) (recognizing that the state's
participation may be evidence of a lack of predisposition in the defendant and suggesting
that sometimes police involvement may be so outrageous that it requires discharging the
defendant); State v. Talbot, 364 A.2d 9, 13 (N.J. 1976) (holding that when police provide the
defendant with heroin "for the purpose of then arranging a sale of the heroin by the
defendant to an undercover officer[,] ... defendant has been entrapped as a matter of law
even though predisposition to commit the crime may appear").
141. See, e.g., James, 484 N.W.2d at 800-01 (describing drug busts in which police
officers posed as drug dealers and "only 'sold' to those who approached them").
142. James, 484 N.W.2d at 800-03. See Patrick Springer, Fargo drug arrest conviction
overturned, THE FORUM, Feb. 27, 1992, at Al, A12 (quoting the Fargo Chief of Police to say
that reverse stings were in use "quite awhile"); Rob Johnson, Narcotics team busts 34 on
drug charges; Sting nabs suspected crack buyers, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL AND
CONSTITUTION (Gwinnett Extra), Dec. 14, 1991, at J16 (reporting the frequency of reverse
stings for at least one law enforcement jurisdiction).
143. See, e.g., Talbot, 364 A.2d at 13.
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agent buys that same contraband from the suspect, entrapment
has occurred as a matter of law.' 44 Nevertheless, it appears that
prior to the North Dakota Supreme Court decision in State v.
Kummer,145 the Mississippi Supreme Court was the only highest
state court to find that the typical reverse sting constituted entrap-
ment as a matter of law.146
III. ANALYSIS
State v. Kummer147 is the first case in which the North Dakota
Supreme Court found entrapment despite a contrary trial court
ruling.' 48 Prior to Kummer, the court's scope of review was lim-
ited to an examination of the reasonableness of the trial courts'
findings of fact and of the inferences to be drawn from those find-
ings.149 Nevertheless, prior statements of the supreme court rec-
ognized that when the facts "or the inferences to be drawn from
144. Id.
145. 481 N.W. 2d 437, 444 (N.D. 1992).
146. Barnes v. State, 493 So. 2d 313, 315-16 (Miss. 1986). But see Moore v. State, 534
So. 2d 557, 559 (Miss. 1988) (limiting the Barnes holding to mean only that the state's
furnishing of the contraband is merely evidence of a lack of predisposition).
147. 481 N.W.2d 437 (N.D. 1992).
148. State v. Kummer, 481 N.W. 2d 437, 444 (N.D. 1992). Prior to Kummer, the court
remanded cases in which the jury instruction had erroneously applied the subjective test by
placing the defendant's predisposition at issue. E.g., State v. Pfister, 264 N.W.2d 694 (N.D.
1978). Also, the court overturned a bench trial verdict which found entrapment had not
occurred because the defendants were predisposed. State v. Mees, 272 N.W.2d 284, 288
(N.D. 1978). The trial judge had erroneously admitted evidence of the defendants' pasts.
Id. at 289.
149. See, e.g., State v. Kluck, 340 N.W.2d 446, 447 (N.D. 1983) (citing precedents which
required the court to defer to the trial court's findings of fact and those inferences which
are reasonable).
A survey of pre-Kummer entrapment case law in North Dakota shows a great deal of
deference to trial court findings of fact. For example, the supreme court upheld a
conviction in which a police informant had pressured the defendant by stressing that the
two of them were friends, that the defendant owed the informant a favor, and that the
informant's other friend (really a special agent from the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension) "desperately needed marijuana." Id. at 447. The Kluck court decided that
the trial court, the proper trier of fact, had "properly considered the elements of
entrapment." Id.
Also, the court has consistently refused to find that undue psychological pressure
required a finding of entrapment in cases in which the factfinder had rejected the
argument. See State v. Bartkowski, 290 N.W.2d 218, 220 (N.D. 1980). The court, in
Bartkowski, found that even if the jury had believed the defendant's testimony regarding
the number of times he was contacted by the informant, it could have "concluded that a
normally law-abiding person would not have been persuaded to sell drugs." Id. See also
State v. Hoffman, 291 N.W.2d 430 (N.D. 1980). In Hoffman, the agent befriended the
defendant and developed his trust. Id. at 431. The court found that elements of "trickery
and deception" did not always rise to the level of outrageousness or unacceptability which
the entrapment statute was "designed to prevent." Id. at 432. The issue had been properly
weighed by the jury. Id. at 433.
In State v. Flamm, the defendant alleged that the informant threatened him with a
gun. 338 N.W.2d 826, 827 (N.D. 1983). The court found that Flamm's willing participation
in criminal activity did not directly result from the alleged threat. State v. Flamm, 338
N.W.2d 826, 829 (N.D. 1983). The court rejected an argument that the jury had "arbitrarily
disregarded" Flamm's entrapment evidence. Id.
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the facts" are not disputed, the court "may determine the exist-
ence of entrapment as a matter of law."' 150 The Kummer court
was faced with no factual disputes, 5 1 so it was free to decide
whether Mr. Kummer was entrapped as a matter of law.1 5 2
The supreme court started by explaining the requirements for
the affirmative defense of entrapment as provided by statute and
explained by precedent.' 5 3 It ended its explication of entrapment
law by simply stating that "[plolice use of unlawful means is
entrapment."'154 Although no precedent was cited for this state-
ment, at a later point the court cites the Final Report of the
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, which
drafted the statute, to suggest that North Dakota's entrapment
defense was meant to deter "'improper law enforcement tech-
niques.' "'55 In finding that the reverse sting which snared Kum-
mer was illegal, the Kummer court cited case law from several
jurisdictions which suggested that entrapment as a matter of law
occurs whenever contraband is provided by one law enforcement
agent to a defendant who then sells it to another law enforcement
agent.' 56 The Kummer court went further than the cited case law
150. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 441. See State v. Rehling, 426 N.W.2d 6, 7 (N.D. 1988)
(recognizing a factual dispute which precluded a finding of entrapment "as a matter of
law"); State v. Pfister, 264 N.W.2d 694, 700 (1978) (finding that when there is no dispute "as
to the facts and the inferences to be drawn from them," the court determines the
entrapment issue as a matter of law).
151. Brief for Appellant at 11, State v. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d 437 (N.D. 1992) (No.
910138); The Kummer opinion itself stated "that the undisputed facts of this case show that
the police used unlawful means to induce the crime." Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 438
(emphasis added).
152. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 441.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 443-44 (quoting State v. Pfister, 264 N.W. 2d 694, 697 (N.D. 1978)).
156. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 441. See State v. Talbot, 364 A.2d 9, 13 (NJ. 1976)
(finding entrapment as a matter of law when an informer furnishes heroin to a defendant
"for the purpose of then arranging a sale" to an undercover police officer); State v.
Overmann, 220 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Iowa 1974) (finding that if no fact issue exists and the
evidence discloses that one government agent supplied drugs to a defendant and another
government agent "reappropriate[s] any of those drugs," then a " 'take-back entrapment'"
has been shown, requiring "dismissal as a matter of law").
Several of the cases which the Kummer court cited are from federal jurisdictions in
which the precedential value was abrogated by the United States Supreme Court.
Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 442. The Kummer court reasoned that although the precedential
value had been lost to the federal courts, "the rule announced in those cases is 'quite
compatible with the existing law of entrapment' in jurisdictions, like ours, that employ the
'objective' theory." Id.
Among the federal cases cited is United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir.
1971) (finding that when a government informant had purchased the heroin, had imported
it into the United States from Mexico, and then had worked with the defendant to cut the
heroin before inducing defendant to sell the drug to another government agent,
entrapment had occurred as a matter of law), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973). The court
also cited United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975). The West court found that
the government's role had "passed the point of toleration" when the informant, attempting
to mitigate his own troubles with the law, coaxed an old friend whom he knew was in need
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:969
by finding the "typical reverse sting" unacceptable, stating that
"[i]t is the conduct of the government agent in furnishing the ille-
gal drugs to the accused, rather than the accused's subsequent sale
to another government agent, that is the improper governmental
inducement."'- 7
Also, according to the Kummer court, the rationalization for
using extraordinary law enforcement measures, i.e., necessity, is
of money to join him in the selling of drugs to another law enforcement agent. Id. at 1085.
In West, the prosecutor admitted in closing argument that West had no history of drug
trafficking. Id. "Moreover," the court said:
such conduct does not facilitate discovery or suppression of ongoing illicit traffic
in drugs. It serves no justifying social objective. Rather, it puts the law
enforcement authorities in the position of creating new crime for the sake of
bringing charges against a person they had persuaded to participate in
wrongdoing.
Id. These and other federal cases which found entrapment as a matter of law when the law
enforcement agents provided the contraband were later abrogated by the United States
Supreme Court. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,490 (1976). Writing for the Hamp-
ton majority, Justice Rehnquist stated that "[t]he remedy of the criminal defendant with
respect to the acts of Government agents, which, far from being resisted, are encouraged
by him, lies solely in the defense of entrapment." Id. Justice Rehnquist then noted that
"petitioner's conceded predisposition rendered this defense unavailable to him." Id.
The Court had previously left open the possibility of finding meritorious defenses if law
enforcement conduct "is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction .... United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973). That possibility survives because Justice Rehnquist's
Hampton opinion was joined by only two other members of the Court. Hampton, 425 U.S.
at 485. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, while agreeing
with Justice Rehnquist's entrapment analysis, refused to join the plurality's conclusion that
the "concept of fundamental fairness inherent in the guarantee of due process would never
prevent the conviction of a predisposed defendant, regardless of the outrageousness of
police behavior in light of surrounding circumstances." Id. at 492-93 (Powell, J. concur-
ring). Powell declined to go beyond the opinion in Russell, seeing no distinction between
the police providing a necessary ingredient in the manufacture of narcotics and the police
providing the finished product. Id.
157. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 442. But see United States v. Perez, 959 F.2d 164, 170
(10th Cir. 1992) (displaying a rather cursory acceptance of reverse stings even when no
"'reasonable suspicion" of the particular target existed) vacated in part on other grounds,
989 F.2d 1574 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Huff, 959 F.2d 731, 737 (8th Cir.) (finding
no reason for an entrapment instruction in a reverse sting case in which the police
involvement was quite pervasive) cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 162 (1992); State v. Gessler, 690
P.2d 98, 104 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (refusing to find entrapment as a matter of law in a
reverse sting case in which officers provided free samples of marijuana, seeing a need for
undercover agents to be able to develop the trust of those groups which they infiltrate).
For a post-Kummer decision, see Rivera v. State, 846 P.2d 1 (Wyo. 1993). The Rivera
court, using the subjective approach, rejected an entrapment defense based on law
enforcement officers obtaining four hundred pounds of marijuana from the Colorado
Springs (Colorado) Police Department, setting up shop at a Jackson, Wyoming motel, and
using an informant to lure buyers into the room where they could be filmed by hidden
video equipment. Id. at 2-4. In an emphatic dissent in which Kummer is cited, Justice
Urbigkit recommends that Wyoming adopt a hybrid subjective/objective standard for
entrapment. Id. at 7-37 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting). Justice Urbigkit begins his dissent in
Rivera by expressing a major concern for allowing reverse stings with the following bit of
sarcasm: "It was 'dry' in Jackson, Wyoming - meaning the availability of marijuana or
other illegal drugs for purchase around town was limited. Knowing this, the local police set
about curing the problem." Id. at 7. While inviting a careful reexamination of Wyoming
entrapment law, Justice Urbigkit includes throughout his opinion a thorough list of current
authorities on the subject. Id. at 7-37.
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lacking when the police supply the contraband.15 8 The court rea-
soned that a rule forbidding the police supplying of contraband
would eliminate only an unnecessary enforcement technique
because persons dealing in narcotics would have their own
supplies. 159
The Kummer court also listed a number of public policy argu-
ments against allowing police to supply contraband. 160  Initially,
the court suggested that a rule against the police furnishing con-
traband in sting operations would be easy to explain to the
police. 16  Moreover, the court reasoned, forbidding the police
from supplying the contraband would protect innocent people. 6 2
The court recognized the chance that recipients of the police
action would actually use the drugs and recognized the danger
that some law enforcement agents would divert the drugs "to ille-
gal channels."' 6 3 The court suggested that police corruption can
more easily be avoided by making sure that seized drugs are
158. Kummer, 481 N.w.2d at 442. See also Case Comment, Criminal Procedure:
Entrapment Rationale Employed to Condemn Government's Furnishing of Contraband, 59
MINN. L. REV. 444, 457-58 (1974) (allowing that the conventional sting, in which police
officers use deception to buy contraband, is arguably an essential means to expose .. persons
otherwise willing to sell" and allowing that, in some cases, providing the contraband might
arguably be necessary to prevent future crime, but realizing the danger of innocent people
being "vulnerable to manipulation by the government").
159. Id. at 443 (quoting Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV.
163, 191 (1976)). Note that since the Kummer decision the North Dakota legislature has
expressly authorized the use of seized narcotics in reverse sting operations. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 19 -03 .1-3 6 (5Xe) (Supp. 1993).
160. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 443.
161. Id.
162. Id. The court quotes Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV.
163, 191 (1976). Park's analysis was in the context of federal cases which had applied the
"furnishing contraband" ban. Id. at 190-95. He suggested that the ban was centered in the
predisposition element of the federal entrapment law, that "the furnishing of contraband
could be treated as a form of government leadership that will normally raise a reasonable
doubt about the defendant's predisposition." Id. at 194. At any rate, the "furnishing-
contraband" defense has since been rejected by the United States Supreme Court.
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1976).
163. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 443. Several cases of police mishandling contraband
which was provided to them for reverse sting operations have been documented in the
press. See Officials look for inmates convicted in illegal sting, UPI, March 1, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file (describing a case in which the sheriff's office cooked its
own crack cocaine and then set up shop near schools in order to lure drug buyers into
charges carrying a mandatory three-year prison term). A state appeals court ruled that
even prisoners who had not protested their convictions must be released if their
prosecution relied on this "outrageous" set up. Id. See also Kelly v. State, 593 So.2d 1060,
1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing a conviction on due process grounds because of
the police manufacture of "crack"). See Mike Clary, Sheriff skirts the legal limits; Florida
lawman says he will fight court to reopen his department's crack lab, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16,
1992, at A5 (noting that the Florida appeals court was "troubled by the sheriffs inability to
account for all of the cocaine rocks" and noting the sheriffs denial of an accountability
problem). Moreover, a grand jury in Texas investigated the police mishandling of drugs
supplied for reverse stings and the use of such stings as cover for illegal moneymaking
operations. Reverse stings probed, UPI, Jan. 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File.
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immediately locked into the evidence room."'
In deciding that reverse narcotic stings are illegal, the Kum-
mer court considered that the police handling of the cocaine in
this case was not authorized in writing by any supervisory person-
nel and that it was directly contrary to the Fargo Police Depart-
ment's Standard Operating Procedures.' 65 The court found no
statutory authority for allowing resale by the police of confiscated
evidence, but found that, under state law, the evidence is to be
held " 'subject only to the orders and decrees of the district
court.' 166 The court refused to countenance the "[s]ubversion of
statutes, rules, or regulations by law enforcement officers, in order
to induce a criminal violation.' ' 67
In summary, the court found that reverse stings in which the
police supply the contraband are illegal and, therefore, constitute
entrapment as a matter of law. 6 In doing so, the court decided
that some illegal police conduct constitutes entrapment whether
or not it would have induced a normal law-abiding person to com-
mit a crime.1
9
IV. IMPLICATIONS
A. KUMMER's EFFECT ON CASES DECIDED UNDER THE
FORMER "NORMAL LAW-ABIDING PERSON"
ENTRAPMENT STATUTE.
Although the court unanimously concurred in the result, a
count of votes and a careful look at two special concurrences is
necessary to evaluate the possible ramifications of the Kummer
opinion on future North Dakota entrapment law. Justice
Meschke's opinion garnered a majority;170 however, one member
of that majority, Surrogate Judge Pederson, specially concurred to
express frustration because the then current entrapment statute
improperly kept the government from providing evidence of why
164. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 443.
165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-36(4) (1991)). Note that the legislature
has since acted to give police the authority to offer confiscated narcotics for sale in reverse
sting operations. N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-36(5Xe) (Supp. 1993).
167. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 443 (citations omitted).
168. Id. at 442-44.
169. Id. at 444. The court found that the police provided the cocaine "that formed the
basis for Kummer's prosecution" and, therefore, "Kummer has established entrapment as a
matter of law." Id.
170. Id. Justice Meschke's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Erickstad and Surrogate
Judge Pederson. Id. However, Judge Pederson wrote a separate opinion. Id. at 445-46.
Justice Levine concurred in the result. Id. at 444. Justice VandeWalle wrote a special
concurring opinion. Id.
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an individual is targeted by a reverse sting in the first place.' 71 He
suggested that the legislature reexamine its position and redefine
entrapment to benefit the normal law-abiders and to give police
"authority to engage the 'predisposed' professional criminal in a
battle of 'no holds barred.' "172
In another special concurrence, Justice VandeWalle rejected
the majority's reliance on the entrapment law and recommended
that the court simply refuse to sustain a conviction gained by the
"intolerable conduct" of the police. 173 He found it absurd to dif-
ferentiate between the defendant who buys contraband from a
professional drug dealer and the defendant who buys contraband
from an undercover police officer whom he believes is a profes-
sional drug dealer. 174  He suggested that the majority and the
cited jurisdictions had "cast their opinions in more traditional and,
perhaps, more tenable forms such as entrapment" when they
should have confronted the issue and declared that "as a matter of
public policy [the court] will not sustain a conviction obtained by
intolerable conduct on the part of law enforcement agents.' 75 He
recognized that a majority in Hampton176 had concluded "that
outrageous police conduct may bar [a] conviction as a matter of
law" even while rejecting an outrageous police misconduct ele-
ment to an entrapment defense. 7 7 He reasoned that recognizing
"intolerable conduct" as the basis for reversal of this conviction
would avoid confusing "what heretofore has been a clear judicial
exposition of a clear legislative statute on the law of
entrapment.' ' 7 8
However the votes are counted in Kummer, the result is that a
unanimous court refused to uphold a conviction based on evidence
171. Id. at 445 (Pederson, Surrogate Judge, concurring specially). Compare State v.
Overby, 497 N.W.2d 408, 414 (N.D. 1993) (finding "sufficient basis" for targeting
defendant).
172. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 445-46 (Pederson, Surrogate Judge, concurring).
173. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 444-45 (VandeWalle, J., concurring). However, a year
later, Justice VandeWalle wrote for a unanimous court and directly quoted the Kummer
majority opinion's finding that unlawful conduct by police is entrapment. Overby, 497
N.W.2d at 411.
174. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 444-45 (VandeWalle, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 445.
176. Id. See also Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 499 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Brennan accepted the due process defense recognized in a concurrence by
Justice Powell. Id.
177. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 445 (VandeWalle, J., concurring).
178. Id. Compare Kelly v. State, 593 So. 2d 1060, 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(finding a due process violation in a reverse sting in which the sheriff manufactured crack
because the law enforcement officers acted illegally and because the police could not
account for all of the "crack" - suggesting that some had escaped "into the community").
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gained from a rather routine reverse sting.179 The decision effec-
tively outlawed the use of reverse stings by North Dakota law
officers acting to enforce North Dakota statutes.' 8 0 Consider, in
contrast, that since the Russell decision by the United States
Supreme Court,"" only one federal appeals court has reversed a
conviction from a reverse sting because of "outrageous" police
involvement in the crime.18 2 In United States v. Twigg,18 3 the law
enforcement agents supplied almost all of the necessary ingredi-
ents for the manufacture of narcotics, supplied the building which
housed the laboratory, supplied the know-how for the manufactur-
ing process, and maintained a level of control over the opera-
tion.18 4 These facts set this case apart from other reverse sting
cases in which the police simply supplied the contraband.18 5
When the police have simply provided the contraband, the federal
courts have not shown a willingness to find that the police have
acted outrageously. 86
This tolerance of reverse stings by the federal courts invites
North Dakota law enforcement officials to cooperate with federal
agents and prosecute narcotics violations under federal law.187 At
least one police officer suggested that the Kummer decision simply
required a procedural change for the Fargo Police Department to
pursue convictions in federal court. 8 8 He said, "It's just another
179. See supra notes 147-157 and accompanying text.
180. See Dale Wetzel, Fargo police broke law in drug bust Court rules for Anamoose
man, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Feb. 27, 1992, at A3 (quoting Cass County State's Attorney
John Goff, Kummer's prosecutor, as saying that the decision prohibits reverse stings).
181. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1976). For a discussion of Russell, see supra
Part III. C.
182. United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
183. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
184. Twigg, 588 F.2d at 375-76.
185. See United States v. Gonzales, 927 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1991) (rejecting the
outrageous conduct defense when the informant in a reverse sting was guaranteed a
percentage of the value of the money forfeited by drug buyers); United States v. Walther,
867 F.2d 1334, 1338-39 (l1th Cir.) (rejecting an outrageous conduct defense in a case in
which law enforcement agents initiated the negotiations for the narcotics transactions,
provided the location for the transfer of narcotics, provided transportation for the narcotics,
and supplied the narcotics) cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848 (1989); United States v. Huff, 959 F.2d
731, 734 (8th Cir.) (summarily rejecting an outrageous conduct defense where police
exchanged a one kilogram brick of cocaine for $20,000 and immediately arrested the
purchasers) cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 162 (1992).
186. See supra note 185.
187. Betsy Gerboth, US. attorney vows to keep using 'reverse sting, THE FORUM, Feb.
28, 1992, at B1. See also, Tom Pantera, Fargo to run 'reverse stings'through federal system,
THE FORUM, Feb. 28, 1992, at B1 (quoting Fargo Police Lt. Pete Mariner as saying that the
Department "no longer keeps cocaine in its evidence room" and that "reverse stings will
have to be operated through federal drug agents 'if we're going to get anything
accomplished "').
188. See Tom Pantera, Fargo to run 'reverse stings' through federal system, THE
FORUM, Feb. 28, 1992, at BI (quoting Lt. Pete Mariner).
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office we have to deal with."'18 9
While recognizing that Kummer effectively outlawed reverse
narcotic stings in state prosecutions, 19 0 one must be aware of the
limited effect of this decision. The conduct of the police which
resulted in this finding was contrary to state law and to police
department regulations. 191 The illegal conduct of the police was a
simultaneous and necessary adjunct to the defendant's criminal
behavior. 192 Thus, this fact-specific decision still leaves the police
with a great deal of freedom in their pursuit of criminals.
B. KUMMER AND NORTH DAKOTA'S NEW SUBJECTIVE
STANDARD FOR ENTRAPMENT
In 1993, the North Dakota Legislature reacted to the Kummer
decision in two ways.' 93 It legalized the use of forfeited narcotics
for law enforcement purposes.' 94 It also added a subjective ele-
189. Id.
190. Wetzel, supra note 180 (quoting Kummer's prosecutor as saying that the Kummer
decision outlaws reverse stings).
191. State v. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d 437, 443 (N.D. 1992). Concluding a description of
the law enforcement agents' violations of the law, Justice Meschke wrote that "[s]ubversion
of statutes, rules, or regulations by law enforcement officers, in order to induce a criminal
violation, cannot be sanctioned." Id.
The North Dakota Supreme Court's decision just four years earlier in State v. Erban,
429 N.W.2d 408 (N.D. 1988), suggests that the restrictions the court wishes to place on
police conduct are limited. In Erban, the court saw no reason to find entrapment as a
matter of law in a case in which the law enforcement agents initiated the idea of
manufacturing "kitchen crank," supplied the defendant with money to produce a sample of
the drug, and accompanied the defendant to various stores to purchase the necessary
ingredients. Id. at 413-14. Erban is distinguishable from Kummer in at least two ways:
Erban's illegal act, attempting to manufacture a narcotic, was effectuated apart from his
contact with the police. Id. at 409. Second, there was no evidence that the police violated a
statute or regulation. Id. 409-14. Also, in a 1978 case, State v. Mees, 272 N.W.2d 284 (N.D.
1978), the court was presented with some questionable police conduct when an undercover
informant claimed he was a pimp in order to solicit an act of prostitution in the hotel room
of another undercover agent. Id. at 285-87. The Mees court chose not to find entrapment
as a matter of law. Id. at 290. Mees can be distinguished from Kummer because there was a
factual question concerning the amount of affirmative criminal conduct by the defendants
apart from any police conduct. Id. Another factor in Kummer, not existent in previous
cases, was the public policy concern about whether the police were exercising enough
control and supervision over dangerous narcotics. 481 N.W.2d at 441-43.
192. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 441 (stating that the "law enforcement officers furnished
the controlled substance that brought about the prosecution and conviction.
(emphasis added).
193. 1993 N.D. Laws ch. 221 (enacting section 19-03.1-36(5Xe) to the North Dakota
Century Code to allow police to use forfeited narcotics to enforce the drug laws); id. ch. 117
(revising North Dakota's affirmative defense of entrapment to provide the subjective
standard).
194. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-36(5Xe) (Supp. 1993). The Uniform Controlled
Substances Act now includes the following:
When property is forfeited under this chapter the board or a law enforcement
agency may:
Use the property, including controlled substances, imitation controlled
substances, and plants forfeited... in enforcement of this chapter. However, in
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ment to the entrapment statute.195
Although these legislative actions are far-reaching in their
effect on entrapment law and the legality of reverse stings, they do
not clearly overrule Kummer. It is true that the legislative action
makes it legal for the police to use drugs in the enforcement of
narcotics laws as long as they do not provide the contraband which
forms the basis for a conviction in a case of mere possession. 196 It
is also true that, in reaching its holding, the Kummer court relied
partly on the lack of any legislative permission for the police to
remove seized contraband from an evidence room for resale.19 7
Nevertheless, other foundation was provided for the court's deci-
sion. For example, the court quoted due process language from
State v. Talbot, the case in which the New Jersey Supreme Court
recognized an "entrapment as a matter of law" defense based on
its state constitution."9  Public policy considerations also contrib-
a case involving the delivery of a forfeited controlled substance by a law
enforcement officer or a person acting as an agent of a law enforcement officer,
no prosecution or conviction for simple possession of a controlled substance...
may be based upon the forfeited controlled substances supplied by the law
enforcement officer or the officer's agent.
Id.
195. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (Supp. 1993) (requiring an entrapment
defendant to prove that the police caused the criminal conduct). The new entrapment law
reads:
1. It is an affirmative defense that the defendant was entrapped into
committing the offense.
2. A law enforcement agent perpetrates an entrapment if, for the purpose of
obtaining evidence of the commission of a crime, the law enforcement agent
induces or encourages and, as a direct result, causes another person to engage in
conduct constituting such a crime by employing methods of persuasion or
inducement which create a substantial risk that such crime will be committed by
a person other than one who is ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a
person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
3. In this section "law enforcement agent" includes personnel of federal and
local law enforcement agencies as well as state agencies, and any person
cooperating with such an agency.
Id.
196. N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-36(5Xe) (Supp. 1993). Although this provision allows
police to use forfeited narcotics for enforcement purposes, it does not delineate the manner
in which the drugs may be used. Id. Thus, a court could conclude that it is lawful for police
to offer drugs for sale to lure unwary criminals while still finding it unlawful for police to
seek out an individual, initiate a drug sale, and provide the means for the sale's
consummation. For example, a case in which the defendant approaches the undercover
agent to purchase narcotics may be acceptable because of § 19 -0 3 .1-3 6 (5Xe) and because
the police did not step beyond the bounds of court-approved conduct. See State v. James,
484 N.W.2d 799, 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). However, a case like Kummer, in which the
police seek out an individual not already taking steps to commit a crime, may still meet the
disapproval of the court.
197. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 443.
198. Id. at 444 (quoting State v. Talbot, 364 A.2d 9, 13 (N.D. 1976)). It is interesting to
note that the state constitutional provision in which the New Jersey court based its due
process entrapment finding is also included in the North Dakota Constitution. Compare
N.J. CONST. art. I, 2 with N.D. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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uted to the Kummer decision.' 99
The legislative history of the new statute contains an
expressed desire to legalize reverse stings in North Dakota,2 ° ° yet
it contains no clear intention to legalize all reverse stings.20 1 Thus,
a reverse sting might still be illegal if it is facilitated with too much
police involvement or police involvement which is outrageous.
Legislators also expressed sympathy for the Kummer court's public
policy concerns and a desire to keep addictive personalities from
"being tempted by the government. 20 2
The legislature considered the wording of the entrapment
statutes of Colorado and Florida.20 3 Colorado courts apply only a
subjective standard.20 4 Although one Colorado court acknowl-
edged the existence of a due process, outrageous conduct defense,
it approvingly cited the United States Supreme Court plurality
opinion in Hampton which suggested that the defense would be
unavailable to a predisposed defendant. 20 5  Florida courts con-
tinue to apply a court determined threshold objective test for
entrapment along with the subjective test provided by statute.20 6
North Dakota's new statute is more like Florida's than Colo-
rado's.20 7 Thus, the wording of the new entrapment statute does
not precisely overrule the Kummer decision.
Entrapment is still an affirmative defense. 20  In North
Dakota, affirmative defenses must be proved by a preponderance
of the evidence. 20 9 Thus, entrapment defendants may now have
to prove both inducement and lack of predisposition by a prepon-
199. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 442-44.
200. See, e.g., Hearings on Senate Bills 2171 and 2058, Senate Judiciary Committee,
Legislative Council Report for Senator Nelson 3 (Mar. 1992).
201. It suggests an intention to allow police to "sell[] drugs to a drug dealer." See, e.g.,
Hearings on Senate Bills 2171 and 2058, Senate Judiciary Committee, Testimony of U.S.
Attorney Steve Easton 1 (Jan. 13, 1993).
202. Hearings on Senate Bills 2171 and 2058, Senate Judiciary Committee 2 (Jan. 13,
1993) (containing dialogue between Senators Maxson and Stenejhem).
203. Hearings on Senate Bills 2171 and 2058, Senate Judiciary Committee, Legislative
Council Report for Senator Nelson 2-3 (Mar. 1992). See also COLO. REV. STAT. 18-1-701
(1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.201 (West 1992).
204. See, e.g., Bailey v. People, 630 P.2d 1062, 1067 (Colo. 1981).
205. In re M.N., 761 P.2d 1124, 1127 (Colo. 1988).
206. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text for a discussion of Florida's
hybrid approach to entrapment.
207. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (Supp. 1993). See also COLO. REV. STAT. 18-1-701
(1986) (defining a person who lacks predisposition as one "who, but for the inducement,
would not have conceived of or engaged in conduct of the sort induced") (emphasis added);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.201 (West 1992) (providing that entrapment occurs when "a law
enforcement officer.., for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of a crime,
... induces ... a person other than one who is ready to commit [such crime].") (emphasis
added).
208. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11(1) (Supp. 1993).
209. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-03(3) (1985).
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derance of the evidence. This requirement would differ from the
federal subjective approach which requires the government to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predis-
posed.210  However, the Florida Supreme Court construes its
entrapment statute to require the defendant to prove both ele-
ments of entrapment. 11
V. CONCLUSION
Even though the Kummer court's holding was limited, it
acknowledged a form of entrapment outside the statutory defini-
tion.212 Prior to this, the North Dakota Supreme Court had not
found it necessary to find entrapment not defined by the statute's
normal law-abiding person standard.213 When the Kummer court
was presented with police conduct that the court did not wish to
countenance but which probably would not have induced a nor-
mal law-abiding citizen to commit crime, the court found it neces-
sary to look beyond the statute to its original inspiration. 1 4 In
doing so, the court acknowledged the Brandeis/Roberts theory of
entrapment.215 North Dakota courts may now find entrapment in
cases in which the police acted illegally even if their conduct
would not have induced the normal law-abiding person to commit
crimes.216 Ironically, it will be the North Dakota Supreme Court
210. See Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992) (stating that "[w]here the Government
has induced an individual to break the law and the defense of entrapment is at issue,... the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to
commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by Government agents"). Compare
Bailey v. People, 630 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Colo. 1981) (stating that "[o]nce the defendant has
presented credible evidence on the issue, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that no entrapment has occurred").
211. Herrera v. State, 594 So. 2d 275, 278 (Fla. 1992).
212. State v. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d 437, 441 (N.D. 1992) (stating that "[p]olice use of
unlawful means is entrapment").
213. See generally cases listed supra note !49.
214. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 443-44 (quoting precedent which stated that North
Dakota's "entrapment defense 'is treated primarily as a curb upon improper law
enforcement techniques' ").
215. For a discussion of the Brandeis/Roberts approach and its concern for improper
law enforcement techniques, see supra Part II D.
216. Compare this to Florida's entrapment law as explained in Cruz v. State, 465 So. 2d
516 (Fla. 1985) superseded by statute as recognized in Munoz v. State, 78,900, 1993 WL
406367, at *9 (Fla. Oct. 14, 1993). By statute, Florida allows a defendant to argue subjective
entrapment theory to a jury. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777. 201 (West 1992). Nevertheless,
the Florida Supreme Court ruled that a defendant who could satisfy either of two threshold,
objective entrapment tests need not present the statutory defense. Cruz, 465 So. 2d at 522-
23. These two tests are much like the two forms of entrapment now recognized in North
Dakota. The first test asked whether the police activity in question was intended to
interrupt "specific ongoing criminal activity." Id. at 522. This test, like the "unlawful
means" entrapment discussed in Kummer, was meant to discourage the police from
manufacturing crime. Id. See also Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 442-43 (discussing the lack of
need for police to furnish contraband to catch criminals). The other objective test
recognized in Cruz contained the hypothetical person standard. 465 So. 2d at 522. Unlike
CASE COMMENT
that decides how the revisions to the entrapment statute affect its
own ruling in Kummer. The court may decide that North Dakota
now has a hybrid approach to entrapment; 217 it may decide that
North Dakota is now a purely subjective jurisdiction and add an
outrageous conduct defense for those cases where police miscon-
duct requires dismissal despite predisposition;218 or the court may
decide, like the federal court, that police misconduct will not
likely provide a defense for the predisposed, entrapped criminal.
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North Dakota's hypothetical person standard which required measuring the police conduct
according to its effect on a normal law-abiding person, Florida measured the conduct
according to its risk of inducing an offense to " 'be committed by persons other than those
who are ready to commit it.'" Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the subjective affirmative
defense protects "innocent, unpredisposed, persons" from being "ensnared by otherwise
permissible police behavior." Id. at 520. Moreover, the two-pronged objective test
guarded against the police creation of crime and criminals. Id. at 522-23. However, the
Florida Supreme Court has now recognized that Cruz was overruled by statute. Munoz v.
State, No. 78,900 WL 406367 (Fla. Oct. 14, 1993). See also supra note 136.
217. See discussion supra Part II. E.
218. See discussion supra Part II. C.
219. See discussion at notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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